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Abstract
This paper examines whether there exists favouritism by individual referees in 
favour of the home team in Argentina’s first division football (soccer) league. We 
study 936 matches between 2008 and 2010, and run both ordinary least squares 
(OLS) and two-stage least squares (2-SLS) specifications. Using goal differential 
between the home and away teams as the dependent variable, we find that indi-
vidual referees have a statistically significant effect on the score of the game, even 
after controlling for referee actions such as yellow and red cards, penalties awarded, 
and other factors such as team quality, crowd size, and crowd composition. Crowd 
size and composition do not seem to affect the outcome of the game.
JEL Code: D81, L83.
Keywords: Referee Bias, Favouritism, Football, Soccer. 
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Resumen
Este artículo examina si existe favoritismo por parte de árbitros en favor del equipo 
local en la liga de fútbol de primera división de la Argentina. Estudiamos 936 juegos 
entre 2008 y 2010, y ejecutamos las especificaciones de mínimos cuadrados ordinar-
ios (OLS) y de mínimos cuadrados de dos etapas (2-SLS). Utilizando el diferencial 
de goles entre el equipo local y el equipo visitante como variable dependiente, encon-
tramos que los árbitros individuales tienen un efecto estadísticamente significativo en 
el resultado del juego, incluso después de controlar por las acciones de los árbitros 
como tarjetas amarillas y rojas, sanciones y otros factores como calidad del equipo, 
tamaño de la asistencia, y composición de la asistencia. El tamaño y la composición 
de la asistencia no parecen afectar el resultado del juego.
Código JEL: D81, L83.
Palabras clave: sesgo de árbitro, favoritismo, fútbol. 
INTRODUCTION
In football, also known as soccer, referees may have significant power and 
influence over the final outcome of a game through goals validated, penalties, red 
and yellow cards, off-side and foul calls, among other actions. Referee’s actions 
on the field, if biased, may be contrary to the best interest of the sport. As this bias 
increases, the sport may lose popularity as fans question the fairness of the competi-
tion, with the direct consequence of revenue loss for the league. 
Existing economic research has shown to uncover systematic bias in sports. 
Dohmen and Sauermann (2016) provide a survey of the literature. For example, 
Duggan and Levitt (2002) find evidence consistent with match rigging in Sumo 
wrestling. Garicano et al. (2005) in the Spanish football league, Sutter and Kocher 
(2004) in the German league, and Lucey and Power (2009) in the US Major League 
Soccer (MLS) and the Italian league, all empirically test for the presence of home 
team bias by considering the amount of injury time a referee adds after the 90 min-
utes of regulation. They all find that referees tend to add more injury time when the 
home team is losing by one goal, than when it is ahead by one goal1.
1 In football, the referee adds, at his own discretion, “injury time” at the end of the regulation 90 
minutes of play, to compensate for game delays such as injuries and substitutions.
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Nevill et al. (2001) apply a control-group strategy, by asking forty English 
Premier League referees to classify different types of tackles shown on a video as 
either legal or illegal. Half of the referees were shown the tackles with background 
crowd noise, and the other half were shown the same tackles with no audio. Those 
referees watching the video with crowd noise were 15.5% less likely to classify a 
tackle committed by the home team as illegal, compared to those referees watching 
in silence2. Along the same lines, Pettersson-Lidbom and Priks (2010) were able 
to compare referees’ decisions in games with and without spectators, following a 
regulation by the Italian government prohibiting some football clubs to play games 
with a crowd present. Their findings show that referees tend to penalize the away 
players more severely than the home team when the games were played in front of 
spectators, compared to when a game was played with no spectators. On the other 
hand, Lucey and Power (2009) find no correlation between referees’ actions and 
the social environment when they analysed the MLS and Italian leagues. 
The presence of referee bias, however, does not necessarily imply that a 
game outcome is affected by such bias. In fact, while referees tend to add or reduce 
extra time to benefit the home team, these studies find the effect on the final score 
not to be significant. Also, these studies have found mixed results on whether the 
social environment, i.e. the home crowd, has any effect on referees’ extra time 
choice, and thus on favouritism. Our paper contributes to the literature in sports 
economics by looking at referee’s influence on the final outcome of a game.
This paper investigates whether individual referees have a systematic effect 
on the outcome of a game, using Argentine first division data for 2008-2010. After 
accounting for team quality, attendance, yellow and red cards, penalties awarded, 
distance between stadiums, and other control variables, our results indicate that 
referee bias is a significant and sizeable factor affecting the game’s score in favour 
of the home team. As referees are supposed to be impartial, they should have no 
effect on the outcome of the game. We find this not to be true. In our most extreme 
case, a referee significantly favoured home teams by 0.52 - 0.7 goals per game, 
on average.
Boyko et al. (2007) study the effect of individual referees on scores for the 
English Premier league. They find both statistically differences among some refer-
ees on their influence on scores, and find that the larger the attendance, the greater 
the home-side advantage. However, Johnston (2008) replicates that study updating 
2  It is worth noting that the classifications obtained from the referees watching the tackles with 
crowd noise were in line with the decision made by the original official of the game.
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the same English Premier data, and finds no evidence for any of Boyko et al. claims. 
Our paper follows a similar approach to Boyko et al. (2007) and Johnston (2008) in 
that we study effects on the game’s score. We differ from them in that we test for 
individual referee effects on the outcome of the game, and add spatial variables as 
controls. Further, this paper accounts for potential endogeneity problems by using 
an instrumental variables approach. While we find that referees influence the score, 
we find no evidence of crowd size or crowd composition on home-side advantage.
In our study, individual referees have a statistically significant effect on the 
outcome of the game, when they clearly should not. Thus, the policy implications of 
this paper should be straightforward. Our results call for actions that minimize the 
effect of referees on the score, such as better training, technological aides, or employ-
ing multiple referees on the field. Such measures have been successfully adopted in 
other popular sports. For example, in American Football in the US (NFL), there are 
7 referees on the field, in addition to referees in a booth instantly reviewing plays 
captured by TV cameras. Tennis has one umpire and multiple linesmen, in addition 
to the aid from the Hawk-Eye technology, which triangulates high speed cameras to 
replicate the ball’s exact path. Cricket also uses Hawk-Eye technology.
I. ENVIRONMENT
For each match, a principal, the Argentine Football Association (AFA), ran-
domly assigns an agent, the referee, plus three side-line assistants. The principal’s 
objective function should be optimized when the agent is impartial, and behaves 
in an unbiased way. When an agent acts in ways that are contrary to the principal’s 
best interest, a principal-agent, or moral hazard problem emerges (Hart and Hol-
mström, 1987). As referee bias becomes pervasive, the sport may lose followers 
as they question the fairness of the competition. Loss of popularity then translates 
into lower television ratings with their corresponding lower advertising revenues. 
Loss of the sport’s popularity also reduces revenues via lower stadium attendance, 
ticket sales, sponsorships, and apparel sales.
Referees have several ways to impart justice and thus achieve a fair out-
come: goals validated, penalties awarded, red and yellow cards, off-sides, foul 
calls, and injury time. An action by a referee can change the course of a game, and 
its outcome. Goals and penalties not awarded, red cards given, and off-sides not 
called that result in a goal are unequivocal examples of the effect a referee may 
have on the game’s outcome. However, subtler actions by the referee may also 
affect the score. For instance, an unfair yellow card shown to a defender early in 
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a game conditions that player for the remainder of the match, forces him to play 
with extra caution, which may increase the probability of a score from the opposing 
team. Because of all this, a single person on the field, the referee, has significant 
power and influence over the final score of a game.
Several reasons can be offered as to why a referee may behave in a biased 
way, besides potential pecuniary incentives. First, referees may have “scenic fear.” 
That is, referees can be intimidated by the home stadium, its supporters, the home-
crowd noise, and thus show bias toward the home team, as in Nevill et al. (2001), 
and Pettersson-Lidbom and Priks (2010). 
Other influences on referees may come in the form of pressure from league 
officials, whose revenues may depend on popular teams doing well. In 2009, an 
AFA official was forced to retire after telephone recordings showed him pressur-
ing a referee to favour a specific team. Club authorities, coaches, and players may 
also influence a referee’s actions by publicly complaining about the designation of 
a referee prior to the game. 
The mechanism through which referees are designated to football games has 
also been controversial. While in Argentina the selection of referees is officially a 
random process, there have been accusations that they are designated by hand, and 
in many cases to please certain teams.
II. DATA
To determine the factors that influence home advantage in a football match, 
data was gathered for games played in Argentina between 2008 and 2010, from 3 
sports websites3. They provide information on all the matches played in the first 
division, which for our period of study consisted of 20 teams. The 2008-2010 
competitions each comprised one round, where teams play each other once, for a 
total of 19 total games per team. A total of 936 games were played between 2008 
and 2010, in which 26 different referees officiated.
For each match the variables gathered are: date, referee, stadium attendance, 
distance between stadiums, and for both the home and away teams: team name, 
number of goals scored, yellow and red cards received, and penalties awarded4. 
3 espndeportes.com, espanol.sports.yahoo.com, and www.ole.com.ar
4 Distance between stadiums was calculated using ArcMap 10.
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Pre-game season standings were also recorded. In addition, we record whether 
a team is fighting to prevent relegation, and whether it is playing in an interna-
tional competition. Finally, we create a dummy variable for the five most popular 
teams, commonly known as the “big-five”, for their large following, and the special 
concessions they get from AFA on voting rights and revenue sharing. The big-
five teams are Boca Juniors, River Plate, Independiente, San Lorenzo and Racing. 
Recent polls show that their followers comprise 86.6% of all fans in the nation, with 
Boca Juniors taking a 40.4% share, while River Plate takes 32.6% (Equis 2006).
Table 1 shows home advantage, as measured by score difference, for each 
referee in our data5. Score difference, which is the dependent variable in our esti-
mations, is defined as goals scored by the home team, minus goals scored by the 
away team, for each individual game. There is a marked variation in score differ-
ence by referee: it is almost zero for Ref1, while Ref22 averages almost one goal 
in favour of the home team. Table 1 also shows the average yellow card difference, 
as well as the average difference for red cards and penalties awarded, by referee. 
The correlation coefficient between score and yellow cards is -0.26, for score and 
red cards, it is -0.25, while the correlation between score and penalties awarded 
by referee is -0.32.
Descriptive statistics on the data gathered for this study are reported in 
Table 2. On average, the home team wins by almost half a goal, as measured by our 
dependent variable scorediff. Variations in team quality, or ability, are accounted 
for via two different variables: avgdiff and rankdiff. The variable avgdiff is defined 
as the average difference between the number of goals scored and received by the 
home team minus the average number of goals scored and received by the visiting 
team, prior to the match between the two teams. This variable can be interpreted 
as an average of the lags of the dependent variable. The position in the table of the 
home team minus the position in the table of away team defines rankdiff. Thus, a 
negative number would mean that home team is ranked higher than the away team.
Table 2 also shows yellow cards, red cards and penalties awarded to the 
home and away teams. On average, the away team receives roughly half a yellow 
card more than the home team, 0.1 more expulsions, and gets 0.03 fewer penalties 
awarded. Mean attendance is 29,500 spectators, with a large variance.
5 We exclude 4 referees that officiated only one game during our data period. Including them does 
not affect our results.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics by Referee
Referee Games Avg. Avg. Avg. Avg. 
officiated scorediff yellowcardiff redcardiff penaltydiff 
Ref1 49 0,06 -0,1 -0,04 0,28
Ref2 10 0,1 0,4 -0,2 0,11
Ref3 53 0,17 -0,15 -0,06 -0,04
Ref4 38 0,18 -0,47 -0,16 -0,04
Ref5 10 0,3 -0,3 0,1 0
Ref6 74 0,32 -0,82 -0,16 -0,02
Ref7 50 0,36 -0,42 0,12 0,03
Ref8 37 0,38 -0,95 0,08 0,05
Ref9 74 0,39 -0,72 -0,09 -0,02
Ref10 72 0,42 -0,81 -0,15 0,1
Ref11 14 0,43 -0,57 -0,21 0,09
Ref12 63 0,43 -0,59 -0,11 0,06
Ref13 30 0,43 -0,67 -0,03 -0,17
Ref14 11 0,45 -0,73 -0,18 0
Ref15 53 0,47 -0,15 -0,09 -0,07
Ref16 4 0,5 0 0 0
Ref17 28 0,54 -0,29 0,06
Ref18 66 0,55 -0,65 -0,02 0
Ref19 52 0,62 -0,5 0,04 0,11
Ref20 55 0,71 -0,53 -0,27 0
Ref21 23 0,78 -0,43 -0,17 -0,11
Ref22 66 0,92 -0,24 -0,2 0,02
“Ref j ” refers to one of the twenty-two referees who officiated games during the 2008-2010 period;
“avg. scorediff”: Average difference between home and away goals, per game;
“avg. yellowcardiff”: Average difference between home team and away team yellow cards, per game;
“avg. redcardiff”: Average difference between home team and away team red cards, per game;
“avg. penaltydiff”: Average difference between home team and away team penalties, per game;
Fuente: Elaboración propia
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
scorediff 936 0,45 1,55 -6 5
avgdiff 936 -0,03 0,69 -3 3
rankdiff 936 -0,02 8,28 -19 19
yelcardh 936 2,17 1,36 0 8
yelcarda 936 2,7 1,49 0 8
redcardh 936 0,16 0,44 0 6
redcarda 936 0,26 0,52 0 3
penaltyh 936 0,11 0,31 0 2
penaltya 936 0,08 0,28 0 2
attendance (in 000) 936 29,5 13,5 1 65,65
relegationh 936 0,08 0,27 0 1
relegationa 936 0,08 0,27 0 1
intlcomph 936 0,09 0,28 0 1
intlcompa 936 0,09 0,28 0 1
bigfive 936 0,25 0,43 0 1
distance 936 176,85 232,84 0 707,28
“scorediff”: final score difference between home and away team i;
“avgdiff”: total average score difference between home team and away team prior to their game.
“rankdiff”: standing of home team minus standing of away team;
“yelcardh”: number of yellow cards given to home team; “yelcarda”: away team;
“redcardh”: number of red cards given to home team; “redcarda”:  away team;
“penaltyh”: number of penalties given to home team; “penaltya”: away team;
“relegationh”: 1 if home team competing for not going to second division, 0 elsewhere; 
“intlcomph”: 1 if home team participating in international competition; 
“bigfive” 1 if one of the top five most important teams in the Argentine league, 0 elsewhere;
“distance”: distance between the home team stadium and the away team stadium, in miles (GIS) III.
Fuente: Elaboración propia
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III. EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK
Two econometric approaches are implemented to test whether referee bias is 
present in football matches in Argentina: ordinary least squares (OLS) and two-stage 
least squares (2-SLS). Both techniques are used to estimate the following equation:
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estimate the following equation: 
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠i = α + ϕ avgdiffi + βX + γY + δ Refji + ε (1) 
where subscript i represents a given match. The X 
vector of variables represents team characteristics. It 
includes relative team qualities as measured by rankdiff. 
We include attendance in order to measure whether the 
crowd size influences the referee. Distance between 
stadiums should serve as a proxy for crowd composition. 
That is, the closer two stadiums are, the likelier more 
supporters of the away team will travel to see their 
squad. Whether a team is fighting against relegation may 
also influence the game, since having a lot at stake may 
provide additional motivation to the players. Teams that 
play mid-week in international competitions may either 
have tired players, or preserve their best players for such 
competitions. Thus, we add whether the team is playing 
internationally as a control variable. Finally, we add a 
dummy that indicates whether the away team is a big-
five team.  
The vector Y includes referee actions, which are 
yellow and red cards, and penalties awarded. These 
actions by the referee may represent fair events in the 
               (1)
where subscript i represents a giv n match. Th  X vector of variables repre-
sents team ha acteristics. It includes r la ive team qualities as measured by rank-
diff. We include attendance in order to measure whether the crowd size influences 
the referee. Distance between stadiums should serve as a proxy for crowd composi-
tion. That is, the closer two stadiums are, the likelier more supporters of the away 
team will travel to see their squad. Whether a team is fighting against relegation 
may also influence the game, since having a lot at stake may provide additional 
motivation to the players. Teams that play mid-week in international competitions 
may either have tired players, or preserve their best players for such competitions. 
Thus, we add whether the team is playing internationally as a control variable. 
Finally, we add a dummy that indicates whether the away eam is a big-five team. 
The vector Y includes referee actions, which are yellow and red cards, and 
penalties awarded. These actions by the referee may represent fair events in the 
game. However, they can also embody unfair actions by the referee, which may 
directly affect the outcome of the game. Thus, systematic referee actions in the form 
of number of cards and penalties in favour of the home team may represent bias.
There are other, subtler, ways that a referee can influence the score, beyond 
the simple number of cards and penalties called. For example, a red card to a key 
player at the beginning of the game may have a large effect on the outcome of the 
game, while a red card in the last minutes of the game may not be of much conse-
quence. Calling a foul right outside the box, off-sides not called, and goals validated 
or not may all be outcome changing decisions. In order to capture these potential 
effects, we include referee fixed effects, Ref, into our specifications, where referee 
j is assigned to officiate game i. In theory, it should not matter which referee is 
officiating any given game, so that the coefficients for individual referees should 
all be close to zero and statistically insignificant.
The OLS model has been the preferred econometric approach for most of 
the papers examining the relationship between home advantage and referee bias. 
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However, in our study the presence of avgdiff as an independent variable, which 
behaves as a lagged variable, suggests that the estimated OLS coefficients in equa-
tion (1) may be biased and asymptotically not consistent, due to correlation or 
endogeneity between avgdiff and the error term. 
To address this potential correlation between an explanatory variable and the 
error term, we use the two-stage least squares (2-SLS) approach. This method con-
sists on estimating the coefficients in equation (1) in two stages. In the first stage, 
avgdiff, the endogenous variable, is regressed using the following instruments:
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where avgych and avgyca are the average number of 
yellow cards received by the home and away teams, 
respectively, prior to the match between them. Similarly, 
avgrch and avgrca are the prior average number of red 
cards received by the home and away teams, 
respectively. Again, avgdiff is defined as the average 
difference between the number of goals scored and 
received by the home team minus the average number of 
goals scored and received by the visiting team, prior to 
the match between the two teams.  
From the first stage estimation, the following 
equation is obtained: 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎̂ + 𝜐𝜐. In the 
second stage, 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎̂  is substituted for avgdiff in 
equation (1), given: 
            (2)
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home and away teams, respectively. Again, avgdiff is defined as the average dif-
ference between the number of goals scored and received by the home team minus 
the average number of goals scored and received by the visiting team, prior to the 
match between the two teams. 
From the first stage estimation, the following equation is obtained:
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cards received by the home a d away teams, 
respectively. Ag in, vgdiff is defined as the average 
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second stage, 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎̂  is substituted for avgdiff in 
equation (1), given: 
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For our instruments to be valid, they need to be correlated with the endog-
enous variable avgdiff in the first stage given by equation (2), and they cannot be 
correlated with the error term in our explanatory equation (3). We perform Stock 
and Yogo’s (2005) test for weak instruments, and reject the null hypothesis of 
weak instruments at the 5% relative bias rate. To test whether our instruments are 
uncorrelated with the error term, or that our first stage is misspecified, we perform 
Sargan’s (1958) and Basmann’s (1960) tests. We do not reject the null hypothesis 
of valid instruments at the 5% significance level. 
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Intuitively, average card differences from previous matches should be cor-
related with average score differences from previous matches, as both are moving 
averages across specific teams. In contrast, average card differences from previous 
matches should be significantly less correlated to the current score of a game. The 
above tests confirm this intuition. 
IV. RESULTS
Table 3 reports the results for the OLS models. Model (1) excludes the mea-
surable referee actions Y, which are yellow and red cards, and penalties. Model (2) 
includes the vector Y. Both models support our main result that referee bias has an 
important effect on home advantage. In both models, 12 out of 21 show a positive, 
statistically significant effect on the outcome of the game.
Also, we conduct an F-test to verify whether all the coefficients for the 
referees are together statistically different from zero. We reject the null hypothesis 
that all of them are zero, thus further supporting our finding that referee home bias 
is present in the Argentine football league.
When we control for cards and penalties in model (2), all results carry 
through. The coefficients for referees are slightly lower, but remain positive and 
statistically significant. That is, referee bias occurs in a more sophisticated manner 
than just through the number of cards and penalties.
For example, when Ref22, who officiated 66 games in our sample, is the ref-
eree, the home team is helped by 0.7 goals in model (1). When we directly account 
for cards and penalties, Ref22’s presence on the field accounts for 0.6 additional 
goals, and remains significant at the 95% confidence level.
It is worth noting that all the coefficients for the other variables have the intui-
tive correct sign. Differences in ranking have a positive explanatory power over the 
score, and the effect increases at a decreasing rate. Also, prior goal difference has 
explanatory power on the game’s outcome. As expected, cards given and penalties 
awarded are strong determinants of the score. The attendance effect on the score 
increases at a decreasing rate, but is not statistically significant. Distance between 
stadiums has the expected sign, but is also not statistically significant. That is, we find 
no effect of crowd size, nor crowd composition on home-side advantage6.
6 We also interact each referee dummy with crowd size and distance, for robustness purposes. We 
find those effects to be not significant.
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Table 3: Ordinary Least Squares 
Dep. Var.: final score difference between home and away team
Variable Coeff. Std Err Coefficients Std Err
constant 0,35 0,28 0,41 0,27
avgdiff 0.19** 0,06  0.17** 0,07
rankdiff -0.09*** 0,01   -0.07*** 0,01
rankdiff^2 0.07*** 0,02  0.05*** 0,02
attendance 0,02 0,01 0,01 0,03
attendance^2 -0,04 0,05 -0,03 0,05
relegationh -0,08 0,17 -0,09 0,17
relegationa -0.24* 0,14  -0.29* 0,16
intlcomph -0,05 0,16 -0,04 0,17
intlcompa 0,04 0,18 0,01 0,19
bigfive -0,13 0,23 -0,09 0,11
distance 0,06 0,15 0,05 0,14
yelcardh . .  -0.12*** 0,03
yelcarda . . 0,05 0,03
redcardh . .  -0.41*** 0,11
redcarda . .  0.60*** 0,08
penaltyh . . 0,03 0,12
penaltya . .   -0.65** 0,25
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Fuente: Elaboración propia
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Table 3: Ordinary Least Squares Cont’d 
Dep. Var.: final score difference between home and away team
Variable Coeff. Std Err Coefficients Std Err
Referee (base case: Ref1) 
Ref2 0.16** 0,08  0.13** 0,07
Ref3 0.15*** 0,06  0.10*** 0,05
Ref4 0.24** 0,11  0.19** 0,1
Ref5 0,28 0,5 0,23 0,48
Ref6 0.10*** 0,04  0.08*** 0,04
Ref7 0,32 0,3 0,29 0,35
Ref8 0.25** 0,12  0.23** 0,13
Ref9 0.10* 0,05  0.07* 0,04
Ref10 0,4 0,31 0,34 0,32
Ref11 0.10** 0,04  0.06** 0,03
Ref12 0.27** 0,12  0.21** 0,11
Ref13 0,52 0,5 0,47 0,58
Ref14 0,08 0,35 0,07 0,33
Ref15 0,3 0,28 0,26 0,27
Ref16 0 0,01 0 0,01
Ref17 0.26*** 0,09  0.23** 0,11
Ref18 0 0 0 0
Ref19 0,41 0,59 0,38 0,58
Ref20 0.50** 0,24  0.43** 0,26
Ref21 0.27* 0,14  0.25* 0,15
Ref22 0.70** 0,3  0.60** 0,28
R Sq. 0,17 0,23
N 936 936
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
Fuente: Elaboración propia
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Table 4 shows the results for the 2-SLS models. We perform a Hausman test 
to assess whether the coefficients for the OLS and 2-SLS models are statistically dif-
ferent. We find that it is significant at the 99 percent confidence level. This supports 
the use of the 2-SLS model, and sustains the hypothesis that the inclusion of avgdiff 
as an explanatory variable may result in endogeneity problems with the error term.
However, our 2-SLS results remain notably similar to the OLS specifica-
tions. Perhaps worth noting is the fact that the coefficient for big-five teams is 
larger relative to the OLS models, and becomes significant at the 5 percent level. 
Table 4: 2-SLS 
Dep. Var.: final score difference between home and away team
Variable Coeff. Std Err
constant 0,38 0,34
avgdiff  0.70* 0,42
rankdiff  -0.10** 0,04
rankdiff^2  0.03*** 0,01
attendance 0,03 0,05
attendance^{2} -0,01 0,03
relegationh -0,23 0,98
relegationa -0,27 0,29
intlcomph -0,03 0,19
intlcompa 0,02 0,2
bigfive  -0.20** 0,18
distance 0,04 0,2
yelcardh  -0.11*** 0,03
yelcarda  0.07* 0,05
redcardh   -0.18* 0,1
redcarda  0.59*** 0,09
penaltyh 0,09 0,16
penaltya  -0.70** 0,29
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Fuente: Elaboración propia
Estudios económicos N° 70, Enero-Junio 2018. 79-97 93
THE EFFECTS OF REFEREES ON THE FINAL SCORE IN FOOTBALL
Table 4: 2-SLS Cont’d 
Dep. Var.: final score difference between home and away team
Variable Coeff. Std Err
Referee(base case: Ref1) 
Ref2  0.11* 0,06
Ref3  0.14** 0,07
Ref4  0.15* 0,08
Ref5 0,25 0,52
Ref6 0 0
Ref7 0,19 0,39
Ref8  0.23* 0,14
Ref9  0.08* 0,04
Ref10 0,33 0,36
Ref11  0.06** 0,03
Ref12  0.18* 0,09
Ref13 0,51 0,61
Ref14 0,13 0,59
Ref15 0,4 0,4
Ref16 0,39 0,5
Ref17  0.23** 0,11
Ref18 0,06 0,05
Ref19 0,31 0,47
Ref20  0.54* 0,33
Ref21  0.14* 0,08
Ref22  0.52* 0,24
R Sq. 0,2
N 936
Hausman Test 6.32*** 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
Fuente: Elaboración propia
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As robustness tests, and to further inquire whether specific teams are driving our 
results, we partition our data in various ways, add dummy variables for individual 
teams, and interact individual teams with individual referees. We find no evidence 
of specific teams driving our main results, nor any particular interaction between 
specific teams and referees. 
Neither the two “biggest” teams, Boca Juniors and River Plate, nor the 
larger group of big-five teams, show significance when we add them as individual 
dummies, nor when we interact them with individual referees. When we partition 
our sample as to have the big-five playing at home against “small” away teams, our 
results remain mostly unchanged. Perhaps worth noting, though, is that in this latter 
case penalties awarded to the small away teams loses significance. We suspect that 
this is the case not because the variable per se stops affecting the score, but because 
penalties may lose variation. In other words, there are few matches with penalties 
awarded to the small away team, when it is playing against a home big-five team. 
When we partition the sample to include only small teams playing against 
small teams, our results also remain mostly unchanged. Thus, taken together, our 
results suggest that referee bias occurs independently of relative team importance.
As an exercise to aid to the interpretation of these coefficients, Figure 1 
shows the estimated home advantage for each referee, based on the 2-SLS model. 
They are estimated through the following equation:
 
 
As an exercise to aid to the interpretation of these 
coefficients, Figure 1 shows the estimated home 
advantage for each referee, based on the 2-SLS model. 
They are estimated through the following equation: 
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖̂ = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝜙𝜙 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠̂ 𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 + 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾 + 𝛿𝛿 𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗 (4) 
where the values for the explanatory variables are 
the mean values that correspond to each referee and the 
value for refj is set to one. The estimated average score 
difference is 0.45 with the highest value of 0.92 for Ref22. 
Figure 1: Estimated Avg. Score Difference by Referee 
 
Note: Referees are plotted on the x-axis. Darker color denotes statistical 
significance. 
0,00
0,20
0,40
0,60
0,80
1,00
1,20
Av
g.
 S
co
re
 D
iff
.
            (4)
where the values for the explanatory variables are the mean values that cor-
respond to each referee and the value for refj is set to one. The estimated average 
score difference is 0.45 with the highest value of 0.92 for Ref22.
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Note: Referees are plotted on the x-axis. Darker color denotes statistical significance.
Fuente: Elaboración propia
CONCLUSION
This paper represents the first attempt to econometrically estimate the effect 
of referees’ decisions on the final score of a football match in Argentina. In light 
of the ongoing international debate about the performance of referees officiating 
football matches, this paper provides evidence that referees do influence the final 
score of a football game. 
Recent research has shown evidence of home bias in referees’ decisions 
via added injury time. However, this bias has not shown a significant effect on the 
game’s score. After controlling for team ability, attendance, cards, penalties and 
other variables, this paper finds that individual referees affect the outcome of a 
game in the Argentine football league, when they clearly should not. These findings 
are based on both OLS and 2-SLS models, in which we use instruments to correct 
for potential endogeneity problems.
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Other popular sports have successfully implemented actions to minimize 
referee errors and help them in making the correct calls. In particular, additional 
referees on the field, and instant video replays have been effectively implemented 
across other popular sports, such as Tennis, Cricket, and American Football. Our 
results suggest that such aides should be implemented in football.
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